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Foreword 
The English language translation of Michel Villette and Catherine 
Vuillermot's book from the original French comes at a remarkably ap-
propriate time in the history of business in the United States. It is a time 
when the need for effective leadership has never been greater, but when 
faith in underlying institutions has been deeply shaken. It is a time of pro-
found economic crisis the depth and breadth of which have yet to be fully 
known. It is a time when leadership in the world of business in general 
and finance in particular has been found seriously wanting, and when 
public questioning of the very roots of capitalism and the capitalist system 
has become both louder and more pointed. As we move from the scandals 
at Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Imclone to the more recent problems of 
Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and AIG we are 
led to wonder about the potentially volatile mix of opportunity, personal 
judgment, and individual and collective accountability that constitutes the 
raw material for both positive economic growth and ruthless, self-serving 
exploitation. 
From Predators to Icons takes us on a provocative and nuanced journey 
through the business practices of a number of individuals and the compa-
nies they built and shows how they navigated through this volatile mix to 
achieve extraordinary success in their undertakings. In an era in which we 
are obsessed with rankings of everything from colleges and universities 
to hospitals to tennis players, we tend to focus on the end result—who is 
number 1?—and much less on the means: how did they get there? In an 
era when we are fascinated by stories of leaders as heroes and by the lives 
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of the rich and famous, we tend to let the gloss of the material trappings of 
success blind us to questions of their origins. 
In the work they report here, Villette and Vuillermot use the lens of so-
cial science as a vehicle for unpacking the roots of extraordinary success in 
business, for analyzing how success was achieved. They have accumulated 
evidence from a variety of sources, including the myriad biographies— 
authorized and unauthorized—of business icons, to build their compara-
tive analysis of the practices of thirty-two businessmen from Europe and 
North America, of how their wealth was built, and of the common threads 
that characterize the roots of success across geographies, across industries, 
and across time. Their approach is highly original, and the data they as-
semble are wide-ranging. They are well aware of both the promise and the 
limitations of their data and are careful to discuss both. Ultimately, it is up 
to each of us to judge the credibility of both the empirical foundations on 
which their analysis is built and the conclusions they reach, the messages 
they send. But theirs is an impressive undertaking and needs to be taken 
seriously. 
Although the original French version was published in 2005, well before 
the current malaise, its messages are certainly relevant today and will con-
tinue to be relevant tomorrow and beyond. Those messages are sometimes 
surprising and always illurninating. First among these is that "predation" 
is the common denominator of business success. By predation they mean 
the ability of the successful businessman to identify opportunities created 
by market imperfections and the subsequent resolve to exploit them fully 
and, yes, ruthlessly. This is what Villette and Vuillermot call construct-
ing the "good deal," a sort of Darwinian scenario in which the success 
of some is built on the backs of those who are less agile or who simply 
do not see opportunity in the same way. In parallel, they note that the 
businessman achieves the status of hero when he, like the robber barons 
before him, begins to use a portion of the wealth he has built in the service 
of "just causes," when he engages in philanthropic activities and when 
judgments about the origins of that wealth are at least temporarily sus-
pended. Perhaps most surprising is their conclusion that the accumulation 
of capital appears to be a precursor to innovation rather than the reverse, 
as is commonly believed. Also surprising is their finding that fortunes of 
the businessmen whose practices they studied were built on an apprecia-
tion for the importance of minimizing risk rather than the more popular, 
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stereotypical view that all-or-nothing, bet the company risks (that pay off) 
underpin success. 
Of course, not all predation leads ultimately to the emergence of heroes 
and to social legitimacy; far from it. The case of Bernie Madoff should 
make us stop and think. In some ways, Madoff was the ultimate predator, 
exploiting a deep understanding of human nature and its foibles to create 
a business enterprise that was successful by most conventional measures. 
He recognized the opportunity born of the tendency for individuals to 
suppress possible misgivings in the face of impressive financial returns 
and to rely on trust rather than rigorous due diligence when making in-
vestment decisions (if Spielberg is investing, it must be a good deal). He 
exploited these imperfections—imperfections at both the individual and 
the systemic level—vigorously. Along the way, he accumulated substan-
tial personal wealth, the material trappings of success, and an emerging 
reputation for generosity toward just causes. Yet as this far-reaching Ponzi 
scheme unraveled and the extent of damage to individual and organiza-
tional investors became clear, the ultimate predator fell from adulation to 
disgrace. Madoff moved from an outlier in Malcolm Glad well's sense to a 
social outlier, pilloried in the press, vilified by those whom he had cheated, 
and ostracized in the social world around him. 
As you will see in the pages ahead, this book is an engaging read. It 
mixes sociological theory with carefully written cases of business success. 
By suggesting that accumulation of capital typically precedes innovation, 
it gives us perhaps another way of looking at what Joseph Schumpeter 
famously saw as waves of destruction triggered by technological innova-
tion. And perhaps most of all, it raises important questions that do not 
have easy answers and that go to the heart of the role of business in civil 
society. How do we balance predation and social welfare, business initia-
tive that can result in economic growth and unbridled exploitation of ''op-
portunity" in service of personal gain, or the need for innovation with the 
need for stability? Villette and Vuillermot do not have answers, but they 
frame the questions, both explicitly and implicitly, in a most interesting 
and provocative way. The rest they leave to us. 
JOHN R. KIMBERLY 
Philadelphia 
January 2009 
Preface 
The goal of this book is very simple—to challenge the way we think 
about successful businessmen and how they do business. We ask: Who 
are they? Where does our information come from? What did they do to 
become so wealthy so fast? What are the similarities and differences be-
tween their behavior while making deals and the common conception of 
morality? 
The framework is also simple. The theory is in the main text and the 
examples are in the interludes. Each interlude is closely related to the 
previous chapter and may be seen as an empirical illustration of the key 
ideas of the chapter. As the book moves along, the strategies become more 
sophisticated and the interludes become more complex. The Bernard Ar-
nault case is clearly the most difficult to read, because the operations to be 
described are so complex. 
The last interlude—a conversation between the author and world-class 
businessman Claude Bebear—is very different from the others. In this in-
terlude all the key ideas in the book are challenged by a practitioner talk-
ing about his own experience as the founder of a multinational company: 
AXA. It can also be read as a summary of the main thesis: neither risk 
taking nor innovation, but rather taking advantage of a weakness or vul-
nerability, is the crucial element in the extreme success of these captains 
of capitalism. 
Hence, the title of the original French edition was "Portrait de l'homme 
d'affaires en predateur." The exact translation would be "Portrait of the 
Businessman as Predator." Our publisher told us this lacks a certain ring 
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in English so we have allowed them to take liberties with the translation. 
Throughout the book, there may indeed be terms that do not sound quite 
right to the American ear. We use businessman, knowing full well that a 
more gender-neutral term would be preferable. But we couldn't find one. 
We talk about predation, a word rarely used in executive circles, and the 
"good deal/' which has many nuances and in French a certain ambiguity, 
suggesting something profitable and (ironically) morally positive. 
For the authors, the case studies (the ones presented in the book and 
others) were not simple illustrations of a preexisting theory. They were 
a serious source of insights and a test for the relevance of the key ideas. 
Many formulations and hypotheses were modified, modified again, and 
sometimes abandoned when applied to the cases. Of course, this process 
of testing and refining should continue, and we will be pleased if readers, 
particularly practitioners of business and Ph.D. students, continue this 
process of refining and testing based on the cases they know firsthand. 
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Introduction 
To know the people well one must be 
a prince, and to know princes well 
one must be, oneself, of the people. 
MACHIAVELLI, The Prince 
It is not unusual for questionable but commonplace behaviors to be 
condoned within a society. In business, for example, many leaders—before 
they become eminent members of the establishment and advocates for mo-
rality in business—engage in unsavory practices. But most people don't 
care whether or not businessmen are clever scoundrels. They fundamen-
tally don't want to know, or more accurately, don't want to admit that 
they know and really don't want to have it demonstrated. Like believers 
in some miracle worker, they have adopted an essentially consequential-
ist view of life: as long as it creates economic prosperity, the means don't 
matter. In other words, they prefer not to look too closely at things be-
cause they don't want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Only in 
times of deep crisis, when the golden eggs are gone, do they begin to ask 
questions—without waiting for the answer if the golden eggs come back 
fast enough. 
We now want to abandon this learned blindness, open Pandora's box, 
and pursue an analysis that may sometimes seem cruel but is indispens-
able if we want to change in any meaningful way the naive and mislead-
ing view of the entrepreneur current in the academic world, in business 
schools, and in books on management. 
INTRODUCTION 
An ad for ESSEC (a prestigious international business school) pub-
lished in he Monde on October 29, 1996, was illustrated by Michelan-
gelo's statue of Atlas holding up the world. Next to the picture were these 
words: 
The leader holds the future of his company. Fortunately, the Executive 
MBA from ESSEC gives you the necessary tools.... Your company has to 
evolve and innovate to meet the challenges of globalization. By turning to 
you to take on these challenges, your company recognizes your potential 
as a leader. The Executive MBA from ESSEC was conceived for those who, 
like you, will make a difference. 
This ad is a perfect illustration of the process of turning heads of compa-
nies into heroes and holding them up as examples to be followed by the 
young. Born leaders, they are different from mere mortals. Charged with 
taking on the problems of the world and transmuting them with the al-
chemy of innovations that will guarantee consumer satisfaction, they are 
titans and benefactors of humanity.1 
Hence, one sees the successful businessman not only as a hero but as 
someone who sacrifices himself for the common good, at the risk of his 
life and his fortune. The task of the university and its business schools, 
therefore, seems clear: describe this beautiful soul in all its depth in order 
to bring forth more of the same. 
Success-story literature—predominant in the United States and ex-
ported more or less successfully around the world since World War II— 
presents the wealthy man as an example that everyone should follow. He 
has been better able than others to adapt to the market society, he has won 
out in the competitive struggle, and he embodies the fundamental values 
of the American dream: free enterprise and equality of opportunity. Basi-
cally, the successful businessman appears to be the quintessential "liberal 
man":2 free from the demands of others, the owner of himself and his abili-
ties, owing nothing to anyone, turned toward the future, always looking 
for prosperity, he embodies the spirit of capitalism. Once his fortune is 
made and he invests some of his profits in foundations that reflect the so-
cial values of his time, he is forgiven for everything, even if his early career 
was punctuated by numerous predatory acts. A robber baron like Andrew 
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the face of the final fortune and the ensuing prosperity. 
In the United States, having set up a large business is enough to make 
vou a great man, but there are other intellectual traditions of greatness 
elsewhere. In Great Britain, for example, one also has to be knighted by 
the queen, like Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin. In Italy, the land 
of opera, the man who has had the most extravagant funeral until now is 
Giuseppe Verdi, and Silvio Berlusconi, not satisfied with being the richest 
man in Italy, also has to be involved in politics to confirm his greatness. In 
France's Pantheon, honoring the country's greatest men, no businessman 
has yet found a place beside Victor Hugo. 
Hence, as Europeans, we claim the right to present the history of en-
trepreneurs from a perspective different from that of the simple success 
story. In this book, we attempt to put aside the three usual justifications for 
studying businessmen. We are interested in neither imitation, celebration, 
nor denunciation, but in understanding.3 
In earlier phases of the development of capitalism, the figure of the 
entrepreneur, the founder of empires and dynasties, the developer of 
new techniques and new industries appeared to be central. In the late 
twentieth century, with the rise of financial capitalism, the figure of the 
businessman—the player of Monopoly—became the central historical 
character. The modern businessman is no longer an "entrepreneur" in the 
sense defined by Joseph Schumpeter. He is concerned not with manufac-
turing and selling canned peas but with buying and selling canning fac-
tories. He tends to build his fortune on the purchase and sale of property 
rights in companies, with the optimization of production and sales often 
delegated to salaried managers. 
One of our aims in this book is to remove the confusion between the 
concept of businessman and that of entrepreneur and to clearly dissociate 
the two. To that end, we have studied the ways in which big businessmen 
in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Europe and America have gone 
about accumulating capital and moving, in less than twenty years, from 
companies worth millions to those worth billions. For each man in our 
sample, we have outlined the growth curve of the revenues of the compa-
nies under his control and calculated the annual rates of growth. In some 
years, these rates reached 200 or 300 percent or even more, giving rise to 
«t \ 
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the question: How do they do it? What are the operations that make pos-
sible such growth spurts? 
To find out, we read biographies with a critical eye, with a distinct pref-
erence for authorized and eulogistic biographies, eliminating the bias of 
malicious interpretations. The results obtained echo old traditions but are 
clearly in conflict with the contemporary vision of the entrepreneur and 
the prevailing explanations of success in business 
The entrepreneur is often presented as a visionary, bearing from the 
outset the idea, the plan, the strategy that will lead to his success. Our care-
ful study of career biographies suggests rather a process of improvement 
through trial and error, depending on opportunities, a sequence of im-
provised adaptations gradually assembled into a coherent course of con-
duct: the celebrated "strategy" was often only the rationalization after the 
fact of the conditions for success. The careers of Sam Walton and IKEA's 
Ingvar Kamprad, men who made the most of unforeseen circumstances, 
illustrate this point perfectly For Kamprad, for example, the accidental 
burning of a warehouse was well covered by insurance and provided the 
financial resources and an auspicious location to test a new organization 
for his stores. 
It is often said that the most accomplished businessmen are "born" 
leaders. The biographies show on the contrary that the attribution by third 
parties of charismatic authority to the head of a company is a fragile social 
construction. The authority acquired by successfully accomplishing op-
eration A can be reinvested in the form of a promise of success in a future 
operation B. A snowball effect can therefore be observed, success leading 
to a sort of symbolic credit facilitating the next success. However, in the 
world of business, even more than in the religious, artistic, and intellectual 
worlds, the process of seduction is reversed almost instantaneously in case 
of failure. In business, charisma is subject to the sanction of the figures 
provided by the accountants. It is tied to the financial success of which it is 
the effect as much as the cause. As soon as bad figures become known, the 
charismatic reputation of the leader crumbles, and it is not surprising that 
in these circumstances, businessmen who rely too much on their charm to 
succeed are irresistibly tempted to falsify the figures. 
Some people are convinced that one has to be born into high society, 
to come from a great family, to attend the best schools to have a chance 
to participate in big business and get rich. In a word, the principal social 
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 e n o n i s the reproduction and perpetuation of the privileges of the 
line class. The members of the upper social classes support one another 
* influential social networks and find in them the best opportunities to 
make good deals.4 This thesis seems to be illustrated perfectly in our book 
bv the careers of Vincent Bollore and Andre Citroen. But it is incomplete, 
because some parvenus have also made their way into our sample. Sam 
Walton, Francois Pinault, and Claude Bebear came from modest back-
grounds, and yet they cleverly exploited exceptionally favorable business 
opportunities. One might therefore argue that the lower one is on the so-
cial ladder, the less the chances of having access to both favorable circum-
stances and necessary resources, but they are never completely absent. 
Ironically, the businessmen whose social origins are the most modest have 
succeeded thanks to good marriages and the decisive support of the fami-
lies of their wives. As for their level of education, it is often higher than 
might be assumed from their claim that they are "self-made men." 
The opportunity and the ability to carry out large business deals will ap-
pear in this book as a combination of remarkable resources. At any given 
moment, in a particular sector of economic activity, a small number of 
people are well positioned and possess adequate resources, good connec-
tions, and sufficient intellectual abilities. This configuration is unique and 
fleeting. In other words, although many have the desire and the potential 
to become millionaires, in the course of their lives very few encounter cir-
cumstances that favor the accomplishment of that aim. 
It is often said that success in business is the reward for those who have 
been able to innovate, so much so that the cult of innovation became the 
industrial religion of the late twentieth century, celebrated in all the busi-
ness schools and encouraged by government authorities. However, when 
we consider closely the careers of the thirty-two businessmen in our sam-
ple, it becomes clear that innovation is not chronologically the first cause 
of their success. Innovation is an expensive and risky process that is diffi-
cult to protect and takes a long time to produce profits; it requires first of all 
the means to pay for it and control it. We propose to consider innovation 
as a means of consolidating and ensuring the duration of wealth, which, 
unless it is inherited, first has to be acquired by other means, in particular 
by what might be called, provocatively, "predation." 
It is predation that often makes innovation possible. The career of Ber-
nard Arnault, the richest French businessman active today, illustrates this 
6 INTRODUCTION 
perspective well. The heir of an industrial family, Arnault began acquiring 
assets at bargain prices by taking advantage of the collapse of the textile 
industry in France and the clumsy efforts by the government to preserve 
jobs in the sector. With the capital he acquired in this way, he launched a 
legal and financial battle to take control of the LVMH group and the con-
struction of a multiproduct global firm representing luxury brands like 
Dior, Hennessy Cognac, Champagne Mercier, and Louis Vuitton, 
Innovation is one route to wealth; risk taking is another. According 
to one well-known argument, a businessman succeeds to the extent that 
he takes more risks than other members of society. His fortune is the le-
gitimate reward for the risks he has taken. This argument, however, is 
more a justification than an explanation.5 Risk taking is not very help-
ful in describing major success in business. Huge gains can be obtained 
in circumstances where careful provisions for risk reduction have been 
established. In fact the businessmen in our sample often outlasted their 
competitors because they were able to arrange localized and temporary 
procedures that made them less exposed than their direct competitors to 
the vagaries of the marketplace. The career of Marcel Dassault—the only 
aircraft manufacturer of the early twentieth century who maintained con-
trol of his companies—is the best illustration of the art of risk reduction. 
The testimony of Claude Bebear, former CEO of AXA, can also be read 
as a source of priceless information about what we call "risk reduction 
arrangements." 
Finally, we challenge two other explanations of success: the quality of 
products sold and the efficiency of production and distribution methods. 
Are businessmen who succeed the ones who have been able to provide 
their customers with products and services of superior quality? In many 
cases, the goods and services provided early on by companies with the 
most spectacular growth and profitability were mediocre. The mail order 
furniture sold by IKEA in the early 1950s was of very poor quality. The 
war planes manufactured by Dassault before World War II were techno-
logically less advanced than those made by its unsuccessful competitor 
Breguet. The first Wal-Mart superstores set up by Sam Walton were badly 
organized, squalid warehouses selling at low prices clothing that had al-
ready gone out of fashion in big cities. 
Does a businessman succeed because he has been able to organize his 
companies in a more efficient manner, that is, by lowering the costs of 
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ducts through technical improvements or better organization of pro-
duction and distribution? This argument, introduced into economics by 
Adam Smith and illustrated particularly well in the works of Alfred D. 
Chandler and Oliver E. Williamson, needs to be seriously qualified. If the 
facts are considered closely, what seems to be a gain in efficiency (or pro-
ductivity) can sometimes be analyzed as a deal accomplished at some-
one else's expense. With no technical improvement and no improvement 
in organization, it is quite possible to achieve increased efficiency by in-
tensifying the effort demanded of workers or finding a way to lower the 
costs of labor or of purchases. On this controversial point, see in chapter 3 
our commentary on Adam Smith's analysis of pin manufacturing in the 
first chapter of The Wealth of Nations (1776) and our critical reading of the 
explanation Alfred D. Chandler offers for the success of James Buch-
anan Duke, the founder of the American Tobacco Company, in The Visible 
Hand (1988). 
Lest the reader think that our intent is only to undermine the explana-
tions for success in business commonly taught in business schools, we will 
provide some explanations of our own in the third part of this book. 
In his 1925 book On Collective Memory (Les cadres sociaux de la memoire),6 
Maurice Halbwachs considered the conditions leading to the recognition 
of wealth as a social value. According to him, "what people respect in 
wealth is not a certain quantity of material possessions regardless of who 
possesses them, but the presumed merit of the person who possesses these 
goods, and who is more or less considered to be the author of his own 
fortune."7 Among the old nobility, merit was certified by a title, the trace 
of feats of war. When the bourgeoisie of merchants and artisans rose to 
fortune, merit became professional, and aptitudes, technical knowledge, 
and human qualities were recognized within the framework of the guilds 
that taught their members the "virtues" that were indispensable for get-
ting rich: laborious energy, honesty, frugality, and the sense of duty. In this 
relatively stable framework, personal merit was appreciated over time, 
but when the market became anonymous, social ties fleeting, and orga-
nizations ephemeral, the link between merit and fortune was no longer 
obvious. One might become rich simply through inheritance, trickery, 
cleverness, or luck. Despite these obvious facts, the wealthy classes per-
sisted in invoking merit to justify their wealth. People continued to act 
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as though those who inherited a fortune or built it out of trickery became 
virtuous once they became rich. Financial status has become the ultimate 
criterion of the value of actions and persons. 
Following Halbwachs's insight, we propose to set aside the traditional 
definitions of morality in business and instead to uncover the "practical 
ethics" actually implemented by businessmen during the phase in which 
they are most rapidly accumulating capital. We are speaking here of a 
functional, operational ethics, unwritten and often unexpressed, that is 
in many respects distinct from public conceptions of morality. It is a ques-
tion not of distinguishing between crimes and legal acts but of analyzing 
the ethical conceptions that are put into practice when a business deal is 
undertaken and has to be brought to a conclusion whatever the cost. It is 
a matter of understanding the ethos of businessmen when they are in the 
trenches, an ethos that has little to do with the ethics that they profess at 
the end of their careers, when their fortune has been made and they have 
become members of the establishment. 
Our hypothesis is that, considering the mismatch between social ethics 
and the logic of business, no rapid achievement of wealth is possible while 
respecting both the spirit and the letter of the social ethics of the time. If it 
can be said that businessmen are virtuous, this is only providing that vir-
tue is defined in the ancient sense of virtus (strength of character) or along 
the lines of Friedrich Nietzsche's will to power. Hence, it is not a matter 
of respecting the laws or ordinary morality. The businessman spends his 
time getting around the laws and ordinary conceptions of morality. He 
tends to follow the recommendations that Machiavelli addressed to his 
prince, Lorenzo de Medici: pretend to respect the social morality of the 
time the better to circumvent it. To make one's fortune, any method of » 
growing rich is good as long as you manage to protect your reputation 
and escape punishment. 
However, whether in France, the United States, Germany, or anywhere 
else, when it is public knowledge that a businessman has violated the 
law or ordinary morality, the usual reaction of politicians, judges, and 
journalists is to condemn him in order to "clean up" the business world 
and restore the traditional criteria for the justification of the wealth of " 
rich. The distinction between "good bosses" and "crooked bosses," 
tablished in the context of the "moral purification" of the business world 
through the designation of a scapegoat, merely preserves the fiction of 
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atibility between business and ordinary social morality, a fiction that 
; ^Igcjpates in the face of the detailed study of business practices. 
In this book, we postulate that "crooked bosses" are simply those who 
have not had the time or the means to clean up their business dealings 
miickly enough. We observe, in fact, that their procedures for the accu-
mulation of capital are not very different from those of businessmen who 
managed to construct an impeccable reputation. The difference lies not 
so much in business practices as in the more or less skillful management 
of what we call "covering tracks" and "repairing damage." 
We agree with the conclusions of the school of economists of the Vienna 
Circle, Friedrich von Hayek and Israel Kirzner, but we interpret them in 
a very different way. We agree with them that the more imperfect the op-
eration of markets, the greater the institutional tolerance for those who 
benefit from those'imperfections, and the more opportunities there are for 
vigilant, well-positioned, and well-informed individuals to accumulate a 
huge mass of capital in a short time. However, Hayek and Kirzner, like 
Voltaire's Candide, tend to conclude that everything is for the best in the 
best of all possible worlds, because the activities of these speculators help 
to restore market equilibrium. The enrichment of a few clever people then 
appears to be the price for that contribution. In short, they become rich 
because they help to bring about the ideal market, which, according to 
theorists of economic liberalism, brings the greatest prosperity to the com-
munity. Against this holistic and conciliatory vision of the market econ-
omy and its principal agents, we present an empirical analysis of the direct 
effects of the logic of enrichment at any cost on the lives of everyone who 
is swept along, whether they will or no, in the whirlwind of business that 
is not theirs. We show how the work of wealth accumulation by business-
men affects whole populations of employees and customers, driving them 
into a way of life that is more imposed than chosen, until finally the entire 
society is affected by the obsession with profitability on the part of a few. 
To understand how the activity of businessmen affects employees in 
general, it is necessary to take into account the ripple effect of financial con-
straint through the intermediary of management tools: managers pilot the 
company using management tools the way one would drive a car or fly an 
airplane by using the wheel and the instrument panel. Midlevel and sub-
ordinate managers in turn pilot the business unit under their supervision 
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in accordance with the indications provided by the accounting system. 
Hence, at every level of the hierarchy, managers contractually curtail their 
own freedom and submit themselves to the discipline of management in-
dicators to avoid the appearance of unfavorable deviations that might lead 
to sanctions.8 The social transmission of the obligation to succeed econom-
ically develops a culture of autosupervision, but the hierarchy does not 
disappear because of that fact. It demands frequent reporting, and when a 
deviation seems significant, it asks the person responsible to justify it and 
himself. Hence, while not intervening directly in day-to-day management, 
the executive transmits to the most modest of the company's employees 
the requirement to accomplish the objectives, particularly the financial ob-
jectives, that he has promised to attain. If those results are not reached in 
time, the sanction may be individual (replacement of the manager) or col-
lective (cutting budgets and investment authority, reduction of personnel, 
restructuring, sale of an insufficiently profitable branch or company, pure 
and simple shutdown). 
Directly affecting all the company's employees, this stream of transmis-
sion of constraints also reaches employees without job security, temporary 
or seasonal employees, subcontractors, suppliers, and even customers in-
sofar as salesmen and division heads, in order to reach their revenue tar-
gets, tend to favor the production and sale of products that enable them to 
obtain the greatest profit margin. 
The exuberant profusion of new products and variants of a single prod-
uct should not deceive us. It conceals from our view the discreet disap-
pearance of insufficiently profitable products. When the pharmaceutical 
industry decides not to develop and market molecules that would be use-
ful in the treatment of rare diseases (because the resources of solvent po-
tential customers are too limited), it provides a clear illustration of this 
bias in selection. Even vigorous competition and sophisticated marketing 
techniques are not enough to generate products and services adapted to 
the expectations of populations. There are products that no one wants to 
make, services that no one wants to perform, and impecunious customers 
whom no one wants to deal with. Harsh competition does not guarantee 
better-quality goods and services; it can even have the opposite effect.9 
It is often said that big businessmen are the engines of social progress, 
technical development, and economic growth. It would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that they select among the variety of possible forms of life 
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S' 5 • tvthe one that will guarantee the strongest growth and the greatest 
^ T b U i t y of their business. In their position, how could they do other-
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° ?To attract investors and come out on top in the struggle with their 
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^s ^ ^ to secure higher than average margins and to accumulate 
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 ^financial resources more quickly in order to be among those who buy 
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from among aU possible forms of the organization of labor and all prod-
ucts and services they might deliver only those that guarantee the highest 
return on invested capital. In following their own logic, they change soci-
ety The essential question is whether that particular logic should also be 
the one imposed on all other members of society. 
It is up to the reader to answer that question. 
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